Secure Sheep and Wool Supply (SSWS) Plan for Continuity of Business

SSWS SECURE SHEEP AND WOOL SUPPLY
www.securesheepwool.org

Introduction

Foot and mouth disease (FMD) is a highly contagious foreign animal disease that affects sheep and other cloven-hooved animals, such as swine, cattle, goats, and deer. FMD is not a public health or food safety concern. The United States (U.S.) eradicated FMD in 1929, but it is present in many other countries and causes severe animal production losses. Industry, state, and federal officials have worked collaboratively with sheep disease experts to develop response plans should FMD virus infect susceptible animals in the United States. Response strategies for controlling and stopping the spread of this animal disease include stopping movement of susceptible animals and their products, rapid identification of infected animals, strategic depopulation with proper disposal, and vaccination. Responsible Regulatory Officials (local, state, tribal and federal officials, as appropriate) have the authority and responsibility to establish regulatory Control Areas around FMD infected premises. They can also regulate animal, germplasm (semen, embryos), animal product (wool), and other movements that pose a risk to virus spread within, into, and out of these Control Areas.

Purpose of the Secure Sheep and Wool Supply Plan

The Secure Sheep and Wool Supply (SSWS) Plan provides the guidance for a workable business continuity plan for sheep premises **with no evidence of FMD infection** and allied industries located in a regulatory Control Area that is credible to Responsible Regulatory Officials. Continuity of business (COB) for the sheep industry revolves around the ability to move animals with no evidence of infection and located within a Control area to slaughter and processing facilities and between production phases. Officials must balance the risks of allowing movement of animals to slaughter and processing facilities and between production phases against the impact of not allowing movement.

Participation in the SSWS Plan is voluntary. Having the SSWS Plan guidance available and implemented, when possible, prior to an FMD outbreak enhances coordination and communication between all stakeholders. The intent is to speed up a successful FMD response and eventually enable the issuance of movement permits after the extent of the outbreak is understood. This will support COB for sheep producers, transporters, packers, processors, and allied industries who choose to participate.

The SSWS Plan is the result of a collaborative effort by industry, state, federal, and academic representatives. Funding for its development was provided by the American Sheep Industry Association (ASI). The SSWS Plan provides **guidance only**. In an actual outbreak, decisions will be made by the Responsible Regulatory Officials based on the unique characteristics of the outbreak.

The **purpose of this document** is to provide a succinct overview of the SSWS Plan and related resources to industry stakeholders and Responsible Regulatory Officials. It facilitates sheep industry preparedness for, and response to, an FMD outbreak.

FMD Response Guidance Documents

There are several guidance documents for Responsible Regulatory Officials to use in an FMD Outbreak. The goals of the SSWS Plan align with these guidance documents.

- **Strategic guidance** for responding to FMD in the U.S can be found in the following *Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP)* documents:
  - *Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book*
  - *Ready Reference Guides*, which accompany many of the detailed documents and materials below, offer quick summaries of the information for training and educational purposes.

- Strategies for a managed response to an FMD outbreak will change as the outbreak progresses (phase) and will depend upon the magnitude (type), location of the outbreak, vaccine availability, and other characteristics. These pre-defined **phases and types of an FMD outbreak** are described in the guideline document *FAD PReP Classification of Phases and Types of a Foot-and-Mouth Disease Outbreak and Response*. This document helps facilitate the development of adaptable emergency response and business continuity plans for the U.S. livestock industry in the event of an FMD outbreak in North America.
- **Surveillance, epidemiology, and tracing** techniques will be utilized by Responsible Regulatory Officials during the outbreak to detect new cases, understand and adapt to the outbreak situation, and provide information for decision making and disease control procedures. The USDA has developed the *FAD PReP/National Animal Health Emergency Management System (NAHEMS) Guidelines: Surveillance, Epidemiology, and Tracing*. These activities likely will lead to additional regulatory activities such as quarantine and movement controls.
- **Quarantine and movement controls** are critical activities to control FMD. These approaches include establishing a Control Area around each infected premises and issuing movement restrictions for sheep and other susceptible animals and their products in a Control Area. The USDA has developed the *FAD PReP/NAHEMS Guidelines: Quarantine and Movement Control* to describe these measures.
- **Continuity of business (COB)** activities for premises with no evidence of infection in a Control Area aim to minimize disruptions to commerce caused by quarantine and movement restrictions and decrease the economic consequences of an FMD outbreak. The USDA has developed *FAD PReP/NAHEMS Continuity of Business (COB) Guidelines*. These guidelines provide the basis for managed movement – which is an important component of business continuity – of animals with no evidence of infection and their products from within a Control Area in a foreign animal disease incident.
- **Emergency response management** during an FMD outbreak involves considerable amounts of data, including investigation records, premises identification numbers, individual animal and herd-level laboratory test results, movement permits, and resource allocation information. **Producers in a Control Area will be required to have a National Premises Identification Number (PIN) to request movement permits in an outbreak.** PINs are available from the office of the State Animal Health Official (SAHO) at: https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal-disease/traceability/pin. States may consider transferring their accurate premises data into the USDA Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) prior to any outbreak. EMRS is the USDA APHIS official system of record for all animal health incidents; therefore, all data needed to request movement permits will be entered into EMRS. This greatly facilitates response efforts. For more information, refer to *USDA Premises Data Transfer to EMRS from External/State-Based Systems, June 15, 2020* at: and *Ready Reference Guide – Introduction to EMRS2*, January, 2020
- **Permits issued in an FAD outbreak serve to document movements** of animals and animal products into, within, and out of a regulatory Control Area. There are two types of permits in an FMD outbreak: specific and COB, both of which are based on risk and meeting certain criteria. The Secure Sheep and Wool Supply Plan will develop permit guidance for the movement of sheep, wool, semen, and embryos (see Table 1). For more information about permits, refer to the USDA documents:
    - *Ready Reference Guide – Defining Permitted Movement, February 2017.*
    - *Ready Reference Guide – Permitting Process, February 2017.*
    - *Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) Permitted Movement (Manual 6-0).*

Managed Movement of Animals and Wool in an FMD Response

Movement restrictions[1] of susceptible livestock species and their products is one strategy for the control and containment of FMD during an outbreak in the U.S. However, prolonged movement restrictions will negatively impact the livestock industry and animal welfare. Livestock operations ***affected*** by movement restrictions but ***not infected*** with FMD will need to restart movement as soon as possible to support business continuity in a way that is consistent with mitigating the risk of spreading FMD. For more information, please see *Managed Movement of Susceptible Livestock Species in the U.S. during a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak*, August 2019 *Overview* (two-pages) or the more detailed *Considerations for Regulatory Officials* (six-pages).

USDA recommends a 72-hour national movement standstill of susceptible species and animal products (wool, semen, and embryos) once FMD is diagnosed. Pending the outbreak investigation, the standstill may be extended. It may take several days or weeks for the livestock industry and state and federal officials to understand the extent of the outbreak and have confidence that animals with no evidence of infection can move without spreading FMD. Once the national movement standstill lifts, movement restrictions may remain for the regulatory Control Areas(s) to limit risk of disease spread by animals, animal products, vehicles, and other equipment. Movement into, within, or out of Control Area(s) will be by permit only and based on the risk posed by that movement and the premises' ability to meet permit requirements. Sheep operations that follow the guidance in this SSWS Plan will be better prepared to request a movement permit once movement restarts. Table 1 below, provides a summary of movement permit guidance. Movement permit guidance for sheep grazing federal public lands within an FMD control area is described in the *Movement Decision Criteria for Industry and Regulatory Officials Managing Cattle and Sheep Grazing Federal Public Lands during an FMD Outbreak* document.

It is the Regulatory Officials' responsibility during an outbreak to detect, control, and contain FMD as quickly as possible with the ultimate goal of eradication. Regulatory Officials managing the incident will make permitting decisions regarding the animal, animal products (wool, semen, embryos), and other movements that pose a risk of virus spread within, into, out of, and through Control Areas based on the unique characteristics of the outbreak, the status of the premises, and the risks and mitigations involved with the types of movement.

It is the producer's responsibility during an FMD outbreak to protect their animals from becoming infected, focusing on what they can control on their operation. To facilitate business continuity (movement), producers will need to provide assurances to the Responsible Regulatory Officials and the destination premises that they are not contributing to the spread of disease nor putting their own animals at risk of exposure. Some movements (live animals) carry more risk than others (packaged wool to processing). Implementing enhanced biosecurity will be paramount to limiting disease spread. A written, enhanced biosecurity plan that can be fully implemented in an outbreak increases individual preparedness to prevent disease exposure and thus maintain COB. Producers should be ready to provide evidence that they have implemented all of the enhanced biosecurity measures recommended in the *SSWS Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention* available on the SSWS website. Additionally, producers should be prepared to manage their sheep operations if they are not allowed to move animals or commodities for several days or weeks. Review the *Contingency Planning Considerations for Producers Prior to an FMD Outbreak* document for guidance.

Wool can harbor FMD virus for a period of time. Wool harvested during, or just before, a U.S. FMD outbreak should be handled in a biosecure manner at the flock of origin so it does not contribute to disease spread. The World Organization for Animal Health (WOAH) describes procedures to inactivate FMD virus in wool and hair. Details are described in the WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code, Foot and Mouth Disease, Article 8.8.32.

[1] In this document the term "movement restrictions" will be used as a general term to encompass the language and implementation differences among federal movement recommendations and individual state plans.

For more information on FMD virus survivability in wool, inactivation recommendations, traceability, and movement permitting guidance, refer to the *SSWS Wool Handling during an FMD Outbreak* document.

Wool handlers and processors rely on sheep producers for their product, making them integral to business continuity. Sheep may be infected with FMD virus but undetected due to a lack of clinical signs. It must be assumed that wool from infected and undetected flocks could be moved to processing. Wool handlers, processors, and others who have contact with raw wool must observe proper biosecurity protocols to avoid transmitting the FMD virus to susceptible animals. FMD is not a public health concern, but can be carried on clothing, footwear, and personal items. Wool handlers and processors must be instructed on biosecurity steps to follow prior to leaving the processing facility.

Packers and processors are essential to the success of business continuity for the sheep industry during an FMD outbreak. FMD is not a public health or food safety concern. Therefore, animals which pass ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection by USDA Food Safety Inspection Service (FSIS) are safe and wholesome for human consumption, even if they are in the pre-clinical or recovery stage of FMD infection. Many packing plants do not have on-site rendering capacity for non-edible products, so any virus in those products would need to be destroyed prior to leaving the packing plant or transported in a biosecure manner. Following the announcement of an FMD outbreak, processing all healthy animals already at the slaughter facility as well as those in transit to the facility is the fastest way to reduce potential virus amplification and further spread of FMD. Processing healthy animals preserves high quality protein for human consumption and reduces the need for carcass disposal if animals were depopulated for disease control. Processing healthy animals from a regulatory Control Area could continue, even if FMD infected animals are suspected or proven to already be at the packing plant. Product that has passed FSIS inspection is safe for human consumption and may be released into commerce for human consumption.

Packing plant employees, truck drivers, and others who contact animals or their bodily fluids must observe proper enhanced biosecurity protocols to avoid transmitting the FMD virus to susceptible animals when these individuals leave the plant. All personnel must be instructed on enhanced biosecurity steps to follow prior to arriving, and after leaving, the plant.

The SSWS Plan includes guidance for producers and packers (when requesting) and officials (when evaluating requests) for animal and/or animal product movement permits. There may be additional requirements depending on the scope of the outbreak. Following the guidance in the SSWS Plan could enable movement sooner, once animal movement resumes.

Following the Guidance in the Secure Sheep and Wool Supply Plan

During an outbreak, premises in a regulatory Control Area that need to move sheep with no evidence of FMD infection may need to comply with the SSWS Plan guidelines to request and receive approval for a movement permit, provided their state follows the guidance in the SSWS Plan. Responsible Regulatory Officials also may implement additional requirements depending on the scope of the outbreak. Also, all interstate movements must meet existing movement/state entry requirements in addition to these outbreak-specific conditions. Implementing the guidance outlined in the SSWS Plan before an outbreak may decrease the risk of disease exposure and spread. It also facilitates the eventual issuing of movement permits, for sheep premises with no evidence of infection, and for allied industries.

To Prepare Prior to an Outbreak:

Request a National Premises Identification Number (PremID or PIN) from the office of your State Animal Health Official (SAHO): Having a PIN facilitates requesting movement permits during an outbreak. A PIN is linked to the geospatial location reflecting the actual location of the animals on the premises. This includes a valid 911 address and a set of matching coordinates (latitude and longitude). A PIN is required for both the premises of origin and the premises of destination. Obtain a 7-digit alphanumeric PIN from the office of the State Animal Health Official (SAHO). When animals on a premises become infected, all locations with the same PIN will be considered infected. Generally, it is best to have separate PINs for

premises with animals reared/housed off-site and accessed via a public road even if managed or owned by the same individual or corporation.

Producers who graze sheep on public lands (U.S. Forest Service, Bureau of Land Management, etc.) are encouraged to have a PIN for their privately owned land (base property) if livestock reside there at any time. If regulatory action (quarantine, testing, movement permit) is needed during an outbreak for animals grazing public lands, USDA and the SAHO will assign a PIN.

Producers may already have a national PIN assigned if they have received official sheep tags in the past (sometimes referred to as scrapie tags) as part of the National Scrapie Eradication Program. A PIN is required to obtain a 15-digit "840" tag or implant used to identify sheep. Producers may also have a location ID (LID) or flock identification number (FIN), often referred to as the flock ID. LIDs start with the state's numeric code, FINs start with the state postal abbreviation where the premises is located, and PINs are usually in a different format: alphanumeric and only seven-digits. Check with the office of the SAHO to get or verify a PIN, which is required for movement permits in an FMD outbreak.

Producers and packers are encouraged to validate their PIN with SAHOs to ensure their data on file accurately represents the location of the animals and not a mailbox at a residence or business affiliated with the animal premises. Validated PINs speed up communication and response during an outbreak. The National Pork Board provides an online premises verification resource for all species. Submit corrections to the office of your SAHO.

Develop an enhanced biosecurity plan: Stringent biosecurity measures are essential to protect the flock from virus exposure. Sheep operation managers/owners should work with their veterinarian to develop a written, operation-specific biosecurity plan that meets or exceeds the items in the *Self-Assessment Checklist for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention for Sheep Feedlots* or *Sheep on Rangeland/Pasture*. These checklists describe the steps needed to decrease the risk of FMD virus exposure from multiple routes (personnel, vehicles, semen, manure, carcasses, etc.). The two Biosecurity Checklists, the two *Information Manuals for Enhanced Biosecurity for FMD Prevention* (assists in writing a biosecurity plan), and the single enhanced biosecurity plan template is available on the SSWS website. Producers are encouraged to implement as many items as is practical before an FMD outbreak occurs to help protect the flock from virus exposure. Owners/managers/shepherds should be capable of implementing the remaining biosecurity measures if an FMD outbreak occurs. Producers are encouraged to develop their biosecurity plan with their flock veterinarian and share it, upon request, with their SAHO. There are some unique challenges for sheep grazing public lands. Producers are encouraged to develop an enhanced biosecurity plan for their base property if livestock reside there at any time. Additional guidance documents are found on the SSWS website, including the *Just-in-Time Biosecurity and Exposure Questionnaire for FMD: Livestock Grazing Public Lands*.

Designate personnel on the sheep operation to monitor for FMD (surveillance): FMD lesions are typically mild or inapparent in adult sheep while death rates in lambs can be high. Animal caretakers should be aware of what to look for in order to find infected flocks. Producers should establish a relationship with a USDA Category II Accredited Veterinarian if they have not already, as they may be a necessary component of disease monitoring and sample collection (surveillance) during an outbreak. USDA provides an Accredited Veterinarian locator on their website. Producers should report suspicious clinical signs to their veterinarian or state or federal animal health official. The document, *Factors to Consider Regarding Surveillance, Biosecurity and Movement Permitting of Sheep in a Foot and Mouth Disease Outbreak* summarizes challenges in surveillance options for sheep premises within a Control Area to demonstrate a lack of evidence of FMD virus infection to support continuity of business movements.

Maintain movement records for traceability: Premises in a Control Area will be required to provide information at the beginning of an outbreak to identify potential exposure to the disease. Maintaining accurate records of movement of animals, feed, supplies, equipment, personnel, and visitors enables producers to provide accurate information for tracing backward and forward.

Movement records should also include the names, addresses, and telephone numbers of animal transporters/haulers, employed personnel, feed suppliers, etc. Maintaining electronic records is preferred, when possible, but paper copies may also be acceptable. If needed, sample movement logs can be found on the SSWS website. This information can help define the scope of an outbreak, but it can be daunting to provide a lot of detail on short notice. Producers can use the *Secure Sheep and Wool Supply Practice Questionnaire for FMD Exposure* to get a feel for the information needed in an outbreak.

Once FMD is Diagnosed in the U.S.:

Implement the operation-specific enhanced biosecurity plan: If FMD is diagnosed anywhere in the U.S., owners/managers of the sheep operation should review, update as necessary, and implement their operation-specific enhanced biosecurity plan to minimize the risk of exposing their animals. If the sheep operation is located in an FMD Control Area, Responsible Regulatory Officials may require that all of the items on the Biosecurity Checklist, and possibly others, be implemented before animal movement is allowed. Producers with sheep grazing public lands may be asked to complete the *Just-in-Time Biosecurity and Exposure Questionnaire for FMD: Livestock Grazing Public Lands*.

Conduct disease monitoring and potentially collect samples (surveillance): Guidance regarding disease monitoring and sample collection (surveillance) types and number have not yet been determined. Responsible Regulatory Officials will provide surveillance guidance in an outbreak.

Provide movement records for traceability: Premises within an FMD Control Area will be part of the disease investigation to identify potential exposure to the virus. Accurate records speed up the traceability process and allow faster determination of the premises status – Contact, At-Risk, or Monitored. This information would help demonstrate that the premises had not had specific contact with Infected, Suspect, or Contact Premises in a Control Area. Find USDA definitions for traceability and premises designations at the end of this document. These designations guide additional surveillance and permitting decisions. Animal movement permits are not issued to Infected, Suspect, or Contact Premises due to the risk of disease spread.

Requesting a Secure Food Supply Movement Permit during an Outbreak

Before requesting a Secure Food Supply movement permit for sheep or sheep products (wool, semen, or embryos) to move out of, within or into a Control Area, both the premises of origin and the premises of destination, including packing plants, need to have a National PIN, and the destination premises and State need to be willing to accept the risk of receiving the animals or their products. Each premises requesting a movement permit must be registered through the office of their SAHO and/or established as a premises in the USDA's Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) before requesting a permit. EMRS is the USDA APHIS official system of record for all animal health incidents. For premises following the guidance in the SSWS Plan, permits should be requested through the EMRS Customer Permit Gateway or similar State-approved permitting system that is capable of exporting data required for USDA APHIS EMRS during an outbreak. If a State elects to use their own information management system to handle permitting, the information must, in near real-time, be linked into EMRS, especially for interstate movements where approval of both origin and destination State must be granted and Unified Incident Command be informed. Further information on Secure Food Supply permits and permitted movements is available in the document *FAD PReP Manual 6-0: Permitted Movement*. It contains detailed information on the different types of permits and movements as well as thorough explanations of the permitting process.

Provide the following information (it will be recorded in EMRS):

- Permit class—where you want to move animals or animal products in relation to the Control Area (e.g., out of Control Area).
- Permit reason—why you want to move animals or animal products (e.g., direct to slaughter).
- Origin premises—premises location (physical latitude/longitude) including a validated National PIN must be entered in a State information system. For permits issued by EMRS or the EMRS Gateway,

the National PIN must be entered into EMRS. State information systems and EMRS will share data before or during incidents.

- Destination premises—premises location (physical latitude/longitude) including a validated National PIN must be entered in a State information system. The destination premises must sign a statement that they understand the risk of accepting animals from the Control Area. For permits issued by EMRS or the EMRS Gateway, the National PIN must be entered into EMRS. State information systems and EMRS will share data before or during incidents.
- Item(s) permitted—category of what you want to move (groups of animals, feed, wool, etc.).
- Item class—specifically what is moving (e.g., sheep to slaughter).
- Duration/span of permit—first movement date, how long the permit is valid, frequency of movements, and over what time period movements are expected to occur.

For any permitted movement, the Origin State can request documentation from the premises making the request, and attach that documentation to the permit request in EMRS or make the information available through a workable data management system. This documentation may include:

- Trace back/forward information. Evidence that the premises is NOT Infected, NOT Suspect, and NOT a Contact Premises.
- A completed copy of the Biosecurity Checklist and the operation-specific enhanced biosecurity plan.
- Written assurance by the producer of compliance with the Biosecurity Checklist.
- Information demonstrating normal health status for the animals on the production premises involved (yet to be determined).
- Diagnostic testing results from samples tested. When submitting samples for testing, it is imperative that the National PIN for the location sampled is always included with the diagnostic submission (the recommended type and number of samples to collect and frequency of collection are being developed and may change as the outbreak progresses).
- For animal movements to another operation, the destination premises must indicate that they understand and accept the risks associated with receiving the animals. States may require a signed form be submitted with the permit request.

Completed movement permit requests will be reviewed first by the Origin State. The permit can be recommended for approval by Destination State, not recommended for approval by Destination State, or rejected. If approved by the Origin State, then the Destination State reviews and approves or rejects the permit. The destination premises may also reject a permit. If the permit request is not approved, an explanation for denial will be provided in the EMRS Gateway. If approved, the producer will receive the approved permit (likely as an electronic PDF) from the appropriate official working to inform Unified Incident Command; it is also available for download directly from the EMRS Gateway. The permitted movement must comply with all requirements on the permit; all subsequent permitted movements associated with that permit must be submitted to and recorded in EMRS through the permit Gateway or other State-approved data information system for permits.

Table 1. Summary of Movement Permit Guidance* for Sheep, Semen, and Embryos located within a Control Area during an FMD Response

Permitting Guidance for Movement of Sheep, Semen, Embryos	Condition Met?
1. Traceability information is available (PIN, GPS Coordinates, and information on type and number of animals/quantity of semen/embryos moved)	Yes
2. Biosecurity measures listed in the Biosecurity Checklist are in place and acceptable to Responsible Regulatory Officials	Yes
3. Trace back/forward information is acceptable; premises is not Infected, Suspect or Contact	Yes
4. Destination premises and State are willing to accept the sheep/wool/semen/embryos	Yes
5. No evidence of infection based on disease monitoring (surveillance)	Yes
Permit guidance to move sheep/semen/embryos if all above responses are "Yes"	Consider Issuing MOVEMENT PERMIT

*For information on issuing permits for wool movement out of a Control Area, as well as FMD virus survivability in wool, inactivation recommendations, and traceability refer to the *SSWS Wool Handling during an FMD Outbreak* document.

For movement permit guidance for sheep grazing federal public lands within an FMD control area, read the *Movement Decision Criteria for Industry and Regulatory Officials Managing Cattle and Sheep Grazing Federal Public Lands during an FMD Outbreak*.

Acknowledgments

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Comments

Please email comments or suggested edits for improvement to: sswinfo@iastate.edu

Additional Resources

The Secure Sheep and Wool Supply website has additional resources available.

Definitions

The following definition is from the USDA Animal Disease Traceability website, April 2024:

- Animal disease traceability: knowing where diseased and at-risk animals are, where they've been, and when is important to ensure a rapid response when animal disease events take place.

The definitions below are from the USDA Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan (FAD PReP) Foot-and-Mouth Disease Response Plan: The Red Book, October 2020:

- Infected Premises (IP): Premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed positive case exists based on laboratory results, compatible clinical signs, case definition, and international standards.

- Contact Premises (CP): Premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to FMD, either directly or indirectly, including but not limited to exposure to animals, animal products, fomites, or people from IP.
- Suspect Premises (SP): Premises under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs compatible with FMD. This is intended to be a short-term premises designation.
- At-Risk Premises (ARP): Premises that have susceptible animals, but none of those susceptible animals have clinical signs compatible with FMD. Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an IP, CP, or SP. ARP seek to move susceptible animals or products within the Control Area by permit. Only ARP are eligible to become MP.
- Monitored Premises (MP): Premises objectively demonstrates that it is not an Infected, Contact, or Suspect Premises. Only ARP are eligible to become MP. Monitored Premises meet a set of defined criteria in seeking to move susceptible animals or products out of the Control Area by permit.

Updates

(2024) The web links were updated to align with the changes made on the USDA website and to meet accessibility standards. The content related to grazing public lands was modified to reflect new guidance developed upon completion of a multidisciplinary project funded by USDA NADPRP. An error was corrected in Table 1: references to wool were removed from the column heading and point 1 since separate permit guidance exists.